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PAUL DUMOUCHEL(Ritsumeikan University)
DE LA MÉCONNAISSANCE
The idea of «méconnaissance» plays a major role in the work ofRené Girard. It is one of the central concepts of his mimetic theory.«Méconnaissance» is at the heart of the mechanism that bringsabout the resolution to the mimetic crisis, and it is, according tohim, a necessary condition for success of this resolution. Becausethis self-regulating mechanism of violence is at the origin of humaninstitutions, «méconnaissance» remains present as a fundamentaldimension of culture. There are however among those who areinterested in mimetic theory numerous debates, and disagree-ments concerning «méconnaissance»: what is it? What precisely isits role in human culture? What is its value? Further on Girard ar-gues that Christian revelation lifts the veil of «méconnaissance»concerning the innocence of the victims of the scapegoatingprocess that protects us from our own violence. As a result, thisrevelation reduces the efficiency of that mechanism and of theinstitutions that flow from it, and progressively brings about thedemise of all that was built upon «the founding murder». Is cultureas we know it then doomed to disappear as a result of therevelation of its violent origin? Alternatively, is a perfectly trans-parent culture, one from which all «méconnaissance» has disap-peared possible, or even simply conceivable? Given that what isdisappearing with the revelation of the fundamental «méconnais-sance» that is at the heart of human culture is the mechanism thathistorically, more or less successfully, protected us against our ownviolence, it seems that we are now left with the stark, and probablyimpossible, choice between abandoning all violence and totaldestruction. Therefore some authors have been wondering if it ispossible to ‘cheat’, so to speak, with the knowledge of violence thatwe have gained, and to devise institutions that incorporate it.Institutions that can take advantage of what we have learned, whileretaining a form of opacity that is indispensable to their stability.
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1. How is «méconnaissance» possible?Before attempting to answer these fundamental, urgent anddramatic questions, it might be useful to ask more simply what is«méconnaissance»? What exactly does the word refer to? Is«méconnaissance» to be understood as a mistake, as false infor-mation, as an illusion, or a form of delusion? Until now, I have re-tained (and I will continue to do so) the French word «mécon-naissance» and avoided translating it into English. In fact differenttranslations of «méconnaissance» have been used in Englishtranslations of Girard or in his own English language writings. Themost common perhaps are «misrecognition» or «miscognition».However, many French readers argue that there is no single tran-slation of «méconnaissance» that adequately captures all of theterm’s connotations and nuances. There is more here, I think, thanjust another expression of French chauvinism. What is involved, Iwill argue, is a different understanding of knowledge.Interestingly bilingual dictionaries give as English equivalentof «méconnaissance» first ‘ignorance’ and second ‘misreading’.French dictionaries define «méconnaissance» as « le fait de mécon-naître, de ne pas apprécier, de ne pas reconnaître la valeur de…».That is to say: «the fact of ignoring, of not appreciating, of notrecognizing the value of...». ‘Méconnaître’ then is to ignore, it is tofail to appreciate or to recognize the value of someone or some-thing. It is ignorance in the sense of the verb ‘to ignore’ which, inEnglish, does not simply mean a failure to know, but also willfullydisregarding something or someone. Thus there is an active di-mension in «méconnaissance». The heart of the concept is not somuch the idea of a false or mistaken belief, of inappropriate ‘propo-sitional content’, as that of a particular relation to knowledge. Thatis why I said that the difficulties of adequately translating «mécon-naissance» into English point towards a different conception ofknowledge.In the English speaking world there is a long philosophicaltradition of understanding knowledge as ‘true, justified belief’. Inthat particular tradition anything that qualify as knowledge is bydefinition true; the agent’s mental attitude to the propositionalcontent, to what he or she knows, is one of belief and that belief isjustified. Therefore if what you believe is not true, it is not know-ledge; if your belief is not justified, it is not knowledge; or if yourattitude towards the propositional content is not one of belief, butfor example one of irony, doubt or willful disregard, again it is not
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knowledge. However, the two components of ‘mé-connaissance’,‘mé’ as in ‘mé-prendre’ (to mistake), ‘mé-dire’ (to speak ill), or ‘mé-content’ (unhappy) and ‘connaissance’ (knowledge) clearly suggestthat the meaning of the term can only be ‘false knowledge’ or ‘badknowledge’, literally ‘mis-knowledge’. Thus the verb ‘méconnaître’,should mean ‘mis-knowing’. However that is something which isimpossible in the dominant philosophical tradition in the Englishspeaking world. When knowledge is construed as true justifiedbelief, ‘mis-knowing’ is more than a mere oxymoron, it is a self-contradiction.Should we conclude then that «méconnaissance» is an incon-sistent idea, a meaningless concept, a mere sound? I don’t think so,but we need a different conception of knowledge to make sense ofthis ‘mis-knowledge’, of this ‘false’, ‘bad’, ‘wrong’ or ‘ill’ knowledge.Many years ago, Karl Popper put forward the idea of «objectiveknowledge». Knowledge, he argued, should not be reduced tobeliefs, that is to say, to the thought content of individual agents, topropositions and ideas imprisoned in peoples’ head. Rather, itshould be considered as a kind of exosomatic artefact. Knowledge isobjective, according to Popper, in the sense that it is something inthe world, which various agents can grasp and use, each one in hisown particular way, rather than in the sense of private thoughtcontent, that is identically repeated over and over again in myriadsof individual subjects. Knowledge is like a tool which we can use todo things, to change the world that surrounds us. In the context ofsuch a conception of knowledge, it becomes possible to make senseof ‘mis-knowledge’ in two rather straightforward ways.First, there are better and worst tools to do the same thing,and there are better and worst families of tools as well as betterand worst tokens of the same type of tool. For example it is betterto use a screwdriver than a hammer to drive a screw, some types ofscrewdrivers are better than others and some individual screw-drivers are better than others of the same type. Second, there arebetter and worst ways to use the same tool to do either the sameor different tasks; carpenters are more or less gifted as carpenters.«Méconnaissance» I believe corresponds to both types of failings.Our knowledge can be more or less adequate for the task at hand,and here «méconnaissance» refers primarily to the content ofknowledge, to its truth. We can also use our knowledge more or lesssuccessfully and here «méconnaissance» primarily refers to theability and attitudes of the tool wielding animal. In order to make
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sense of «méconnaissance» in this way, it is not necessary to adoptall, or even much of Popper’s philosophy of knowledge, all we needto accept is that a statement about the world can be more or lessexact or true, and still constitute a form of knowledge, and thatagents can have different attitudes towards this knowledge. It thenbecomes possible to say, as Girard sometimes does, that mis-knowledge augments as knowledge grows (la méconnaissance croîtau fur et à mesure que la connaissance augmente). In other words,one can have ‘perfect knowledge’ about something, in the sense oftrue and justified belief, and yet still be in complete «mécon-naissance».
2. The origin of «méconnaissance»The «méconnaissance» which interests Girard is not just any kindof inadequate knowledge or of inappropriate relation to what weknow. In fact, it could be argued that according to him «mécon-naissance» precedes «connaissance», that ‘mis-knowledge’ comesbefore ‘knowledge’, which is a way of saying that knowledge alwaysconstitutes a gain over an original ignorance, an ignorance that isnot only a passive failure to know, but also an active form of ‘not-knowing’. This original ignorance, unlike what Rawls claims, is nota veil that prudishly protects the subject from those elements ofknowledge that may subvert the pure exercise of his or her ratio-nality, but a mist in which nothing appears clearly. It will be ob-jected perhaps that this priority of «méconnaissance» is impos-sible. There cannot be ‘false-knowledge’ or ‘bad-knowledge’, it willbe argued, before there is knowledge. ‘Bad-knowledge’ necessarilyimplies the prior existing knowledge. It is true that there cannot bea bad tool before there are any tools, but clearly there does notneed to be any good tool before there can be bad tools, though wemay of course have a hard time recognizing a bad tool as suchbefore we have a better one at hand. That, I think, is preciselyGirard’s point.The objection that there cannot be ‘false-knowledge’ beforethere is some form of knowledge supposes that among all that we‘know’ there are some elements of ‘true’ or ‘real’ knowledge, thatcan in principle be distinguished from the rest, and that knowledgegrows, or becomes more adequate, as the number of these ele-ments of ‘knowledge’ augments. This, however, brings us back tothe previous conception, where knowledge is always by definitiontrue. Girard, to the contrary, repeatedly argues that what is true
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and what is false cannot be separated as if they constituteddiscrete elements some of which correspond to knowledge andothers to falsehood. Therefore, the reduction of «méconnaissance»,cognitive progress, corresponds more to the reorganization of ourknowledge than to the addition of new elements. That is why Girardoften compares this experience to a religious conversion; a con-version which does not consists so much in discovering newknowledge as of suddenly seeing everything in a new light or froma different point. According to him, it is precisely those shifts inour outlook on the world that allow our knowledge to expand andthat make us able to progress into new domains of inquiry.The «méconnaissance» that interests Girard concerns ourrelation to others and that is why it affects and taints all we know.Not only because most of what we know we learn from others, orbecause we mostly only know what others know, but mainly be-cause we do not realize or want to recognize the role others play inthe determination of our «true and justified beliefs». «Méconnais-sance» primarily concerns others and our relations to them. Whatwe ignore is the extent to which others, by their mere presence,act upon us; determine our beliefs, our desires, our choices andpreferences. The point of «méconnaissance» is precisely that weignore it, not necessarily that we do not know it. So «mécon-naissance», like «mauvaise foi» (‘bad faith’) according to Sartre,who clearly influenced Girard on this matter, implies a sort of ‘lyingto oneself’.It is true that lying to oneself as opposed to lying to others isoften considered extremely difficult to understand. In order to suc-cessfully lie to himself or herself, it is argued, an individual wouldhave to know that X is true, because if one does not know that X istrue one is not lying when she asserts that X is not true, and onewould have to simultaneously believe that X is not true, because ifshe does not believe that X is not true, she has not been lied to andhas not lied to herself. This seems like an extremely difficult thingto do as it would require one to simultaneously believe and notbelieve that X is true and justified. Furthermore the common so-lution which divides the individual into an unconscious which‘knows’ that X is true and a consciousness that falsely believes thatX is not true, is unavailable here. For when such is the case it can beargued that it is not the individual that lies to herself, but part A orindividual ‘I’ that lies to part B of individual ‘I’.There is however another way of understanding ‘lying to
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oneself’, or if you prefer there is also another form of ‘lying tooneself’ which implies an altogether different intention of actionthan does ‘lying to others’. Start with the following example:suppose you and me are both interested in the same girl. She and Iare both at the library where I am peacefully enjoying her pre-sence and she has just gotten up looking for a book, or perhaps sheis gone to the washroom. At that moment you, my arch rival, arriveand ask me ‘Is Julia there?’, and I, since I would rather you do notmeet her, lie to you and respond ‘I’m not sure, I think she wentback home’, while I know perfectly well that she is still here andwill be coming back to her seat at any moment. If however, unbe-knownst to me, Julia has suddenly decided to return home and youacting on the false information I gave you, meet her there, my planwill have failed miserably. This example indicates that when we lieto others, we seek to manipulate the information they have aboutthe world, but we want the world to remain as it is. When I tell youthat Julia has gone back home I do not wish her to have returnedthere, where I am now sending you. When lying to others (at leastin this way) we do not aim at changing the world, in the sense ofmaking it adequate to the propositional content of the lie, to thecontrary a lie is only successful, both as an illocutionary act and inregard of the intention that animates the liar, if the world remainsdifferent from what the lie says that it is. Of course the world may,and often does, change as a consequence of the lie, and many timesbringing about that transformation was part of our objective whenwe lied. However what we do not wish is for the lie itself to be true.Lying to others does not aim at changing the world in the sensethat it does not aim at realizing its propositional content in theworld. In that sense, a lie is anything but a performative.When one lies to oneself however the intention and theconditions for the lie to be successful are often quite different.Suppose that I am finding more and more indications that my wifeis having an affair. Yet I do not want to recognize that this can bethe case and I deny flatly the relevance of the growing evidence. Myfriends and others observing my behavior may say that I am lyingto myself, that I know, but that I refuse to believe what I know.Note however that when I say that my wife is not having an affair, Iwant this statement to be true. I want the world to be as I say thatit is, unlike what is the case when I lie to others, where I want theworld not to be as I say that it is. This difference I believe is crucial;lying to oneself is guided by a different intention than lying to
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others. This fundamental intention is to change the world; it is tomake the world as we say that it is. Of course it may be argued thatthis intention is doomed to failure. In this case this is certainly true,if my wife is having an affair my not wanting it to be the case willnot change anything. But, as we all know, our intention to changethe world is not always doomed to failure. This fundamentalintention, this desire to make the world as we say it is, is the reasonof the close relationship between violence and lying to oneself, forviolence also aims at changing the world.«Méconnaissance» constitutes a form of lying to oneself. Inknowledge classically understood with truth as it regulative ideal,we try to adapt or adjust our statements and our beliefs to theworld. We seek to make what we say and believe adequate, ‘similar’to the how the world is made. Our knowledge aims at ‘re-presen-ting’ the world as it is. In «méconnaissance», to the opposite, wewant the world to conform to what we say or believe. The goal ofan adequate representation or fit between the world and what webelieve is the same in both cases, but the direction of fittingness orof adaptation is opposite. «Méconnaissance» is ‘mis-knowledge’ notbecause the desire to change the world is irrational or unaccepta-ble, but because of where this intention intervenes here: withinknowledge itself. It inverses the direction of adaptation within theexercise of cognition itself.Nonetheless, it may in fact be argued that the desire to knowthe world is inseparable from the desire to change it, that our abi-lity to change the world requires knowledge and that this capacityincreases as our knowledge grows. That is certainly the case andthat is the reason why «connaissance» and «méconnaissance» areinseparable and why the growth of our knowledge rests on success-sfully articulating to each other these two ‘contradictory’ intentionsand strategies in our relation to the world. We can Understood inthis way «méconnaissance» can never be entirely expelled out of«connaissance», or excluded from our knowledge of the world.
3. «Méconnaissance» in cultureThere is also in Girard a more cultural and less individual use of theterm «méconnaissance». Here «méconnaissance» refers to anabsence of knowledge concerning the violent origin of culture andmore particularly to the fundamental role of the scapegoatingmechanism. These two meanings of «méconnaissance», the indivi-dual and the cultural, are closely related for at least two reasons.
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First, because the ignorance which cultures manifest concerningtheir violent origin is usually not conceived by Girard as a mereabsence of knowledge, but as the result of a kind of «shying away»or of refusing to probe further a body of knowledge which, ifquestioned properly, would reveal the truth about the origin.Hence «méconnaissance» in culture is also «méconnaissance» inthe sense of not wanting the world ‘to be like that’; of not wantingthe culture we love and cherish to have sprung from the blood ofvictims. There is a second reason, which is that cultural «mécon-naissance» ultimately finds its ground and origin in individual «mé-connaissance». The shared collective cultural «méconnaissance»proceeds from everybody individual «méconnaissance» and maybe viewed as a kind of ‘unanimous misunderstanding’. The violentscapegoating that puts an end to the sacrificial crisis is describedby Girard as a self-organizing mechanism of violence. As violenceintensifies and includes more and more members of the com-munity, individuals become doubles of each other. This loss ofdifferences facilitates rallying against a unique antagonist onwhom all others can simultaneously discharge their violence. Thisunanimity-minus-one brings back peace, and the victim, who wasrandomly designated through the blind substitution of antagonists,retroactively appears having been singularly responsible for boththe violence and its end. Such according to Girard is the violentorigin of the sacred. Cultural «méconnaissance» is precisely thetranscendent prestige this self-regulating mechanism of violenceconfers to its victim as it transforms a dead body into a deity. Whatthis «méconnaissance» hides is the radically human and violentorigin of culture and of the sacred. All of human culture, arguesGirard, stems from this mechanism and consequently plays a rolein protecting us against violence in its various and sundry forms.However given the self-regulating nature of this mechanism,anyhow it is ultimately always violence that protects us againstviolence, or, to put it in other words, it is violently that culture pro-tects us against violence. Though this violence that culture contains,Girard argues, diminishes as distance from the origin grows and asthe traces of the founding scapegoating are slowly erased.Christianity, according to Girard, reveals the purely humanorigin of this foundation and as well as the arbitrary designation ofthe victim. In consequence it ruins, he argues, the efficacy of thisself-organising mechanism. It progressively reduces its ability toprotect us from violence. It destroys the paradoxical capacity of
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violence being used against violence in order to reduce violence.What exactly does this mean? How does this revelation function? Atone level it simply means that, if the agents do not all ‘believe’ thatthe victim, against whom they simultaneously discharge theirviolence, is guilty, in other words if they do not believe that shedeserves the violence it suffers, the transfer will not take place. Theoperation will not succeed; the victim’s death will not bring peaceback. I wrote ‘believe’ (with inverted comas) because there is asense in which all believe that the victim is guilty because they allsimultaneously discharge their violence against her and becausethe victim’s death brings back peace. This ‘belief’ as all forms of«méconnaissance» is thus inseparable from an action. Thereforethe revelation that is necessary in order to make unanimousvictimage impossible is something that will help dissolve indivi-dual «méconnaissance», something that will make less likely boththe actions and representations that come with it. This, as I arguedelsewhere, is not so much the revelation of the innocence of victim,as the revelation of the innocence of the other, which is not somuch the revelation of the ‘sanctity’ of the other, as the revelationof his or her radical and fragile humanity. What destroys this«méconnaissance» is not a belief, a propositional content, but newattitudes like forgiveness and charity extended to all. It is nottherefore only «connaissance», knowledge in a classical sense thatis involved in this revelation, it is also the ‘mé’ of «mé-connais-sance» that is transformed and weakened. That is why this«revelation» makes the unanimity against the victim more fragileand short-lived. This fracture of unanimity, according to Girard,slowly consumes cultures from the inside.It is in fact the fracture of the unanimity, rather than the re-velation itself that transforms our cultures. It is true that this fra-cture is the result of the revelation, but not alone, it is also the re-sult of the fact that «méconnaissance» persists. Individual «mécon-naissance» does not disappear, but it tends to become so to say‘discontinuous’. It is in fact the interplay between revelation and«méconnaissance» that drives the system, or if you prefer, the in-terplay between ‘mé-connaissance’ and ‘connaissance’. In the lastsections of this paper I would like to illustrate this thesis with thehelp of two, at first sight rather different, cultural objects: ErnestoDe Martino’s analysis of tarantism in La terra del rimorso and JohhRawls’s Theory of justice.
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4. Veiled knowledgeDe Martino’s field research on tarantism in the south of Italy ispresented as an inquiry whose primary objective is to determinewhether tarantism is a disease, either a medical condition causedby the bite of a spider or another animal, or a form of mentalillness, or if it constitutes a particular cultural formation, a minorform of religion as De Martino will conclude at the end of hisinquiry. In fact such a debate, or perhaps a slightly different one,had been going on for centuries. From the age of the counter-re-formation at least, ‘educated’ persons have been asking: what isbehind this strange ‘superstition’ according to which those whohave been bitten by a spider not only can be ‘cured’ by dancing, butare actually forced to dance, for days without end, when they hearthe right music? Beginning in the 17th century, people started a-sking: are the symptoms of tarantism the result of a real spider’sbite, the expression of a particular form of mental derangement, orperhaps, even, a sign of possession by the devil? Apart from thedisappearance of the last mentioned alternative, possession by thedevil, the debate hadn’t changed very much by the time De Martinoarrived in Puglia in the late 1950s.In fact, De Martino and his research team rapidly ruled outthe first two alternatives, either a reaction to animal venom ormental illness, and the book is essentially dedicated to the de-scription and analysis of tarantism as a cultural formation. It isnonetheless interesting that these two ways of misunderstandingtarantism remained common for such a long time. Consider firstthe animal venom hypothesis. According to its victims tarantismcan be ‘caused’ by many different types of animals, either a spider,but any one of a number of different types of spider, or a scorpion,or a snake. In fact, a bite is not always necessary, for example, onecan become a tarantata (a victim of tarantism) by seeing a snakekilled. One can also become a tarantata as a result of showing dis-respect to St Paul, the patron saint who protects people from ta-rantism and who can cure the disease. Further, most victims of ta-rantism usually experience their symptoms again every year, at a-bout the same date as when the first crisis happened, and thisyearly recurrence of symptoms can continue for forty or fifty year-s! No known animal venom can cause such a phenomenon. Of co-urse it may be argued that tarantism is a cultural formation that is‘grafted’ upon a real medical condition. Perhaps, but observe. Ta-rantism is not only subject to a particular temporal rhythm, but
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also to strange variations in space. Outside of a well circumscribedarea around Lecce and Galatina spiders do not cause tarantism, andeven in that area there are sanctuaries protected by particularsaints where the ‘disease’ is unknown. Add to this a few morerecent observations. Spiders usually bite men who work in thefields, but tarantism predominantly strikes women to a proportionof about three to one. Most people who seek medical help for bitesfrom venomous animals do not show any symptoms of tarantims,and tarantati do not seek medical help. Finally, the area of Italywhere tarantism is rife is known to have fewer spiders than adja-cent areas where tarantism is not found! Of course, as De Martinorecognizes, it may be the case that some tarantati have been bit byspiders or other venomous animals, but clearly this accident whichhappened to some individuals cannot explain the social phenol-menon of tarantism.The situation concerning mental illness is a bitdifferent. Tarantati do manifest abnormal behavior and some signsof psychic disorders, at least when they are in crisis, and some indi-viduals also do at other times, but these symptoms are relativelymild, they do not correspond to any particular mental disease andthey vary extensively from one tarantata to the next. In otherwords, persons who suffer from tarantism have usually expe-rienced some form of trauma or of unresolved conflict, but theirsymptoms do not indicate any particular pathological condition.Therefore the question arises why did these manifestly falseinterpretations of tarantism (especially the first one) persist for solong? (In fact they remain popular even today). De Martino in hisinterviews of tarantati, and of their families and friends found thatin every case the first episode of tarantism, which usually strikesteenagers and young adults, happens at a time when the personexperiences strong social and psychic conflicts or trauma, like aforced wedding, an impossible love, lost of one’s employment, deathof a loved one, etc. Tarantism, argues De Martino, allows a personto express through her symptoms, and through the burden theyimpose on others, her rejection of an impossible social situation,which for various cultural reasons cannot be addressed directly. Italso gives her a day or two of glory when she is at the centre of thecommunity’s attention. Finally, sometimes only after many years, itallows the person to come to term with the difficulty. De Martinoalso shows that tarantism, both the ‘disease’ and the musical andchoreuthic cure, constitutes a well established ritual in which thetarantata, the musicians and the audience all have their properly
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defined roles. As mentioned earlier De Martino defines tarantism asa minor form of religion and this religious ritual, according to him,functions as a way of alleviating conflicts within the community,and of reconciling agents with a life that is a constant source offrustrations and tensions. Such tensions, frustrations and unre-solved conflicts form a background of ‘remorse’: which he definesas a relation to a past that cannot be changed and that could nothave been different. Tarantism is, says De Martino, a means ofcoming to terms with remorse. Hence this ‘minor religious forma-tion’ fulfils the normal role of religion and of the sacred accordingto Girard. It is not the ‘opium of the people’, but a means of prote-cting families and communities from tensions and conflicts thatthreaten them, offering them a minor catharsis through the acti-ons of the tarantata, who is halfway between a scapegoat and asacred being. Of course this is not the way De Martino presents hisfinding, but this Girardian reading very naturally comes to mind.From this point of view, one interesting aspect of La terra del
rimorso is how much all participants in this ritual – the tarantati,their families and neighbors – are close to knowing the whole truthabout tarantism. They are well aware of the fact that those who arestruck by tarantism are often living difficult times or caught inirresolvable conflicts. They even point this out to the anthro-pologist. In fact, they know a lot more about tarantism, about itsfunction and purpose, than ‘scientists’ who try to reduce it to a dis-ease, either physical or mental. What allows them to have thisgreater knowledge, I suspect, is the fact that they ‘believe’ in spi-ders that make you dance and who dance with you to the rhythm ofa specific type of music, different spiders reacting to different mu-sic. Spiders that prefer different colors and that will die of ex-haustion after dancing with you for three days. But who cannonetheless pass on their venom, and their victims, to theirdaughters, their sisters or even their grand-daughters. They, inturn, will make you sick and dance with you until they also die.Their friends and families all ‘believe’ this. They believe it in thesense that they are ready to spend a large part of their savings, oreven to borrow money, in order to pay for musicians who willprovide a cure by making you dance, and to feed them as well as atleast part of the audience, for two or three days, as long as it takes!They also go through the trouble of decorating the patient’s roomwith tissues and scarves of the particular colour that suits thespider and hang form the ceiling strings that look like a web so that
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the spider can feel at home and comfortable. Finally they take ayearly pilgrimage to St Paul’s chapel in Galatina. These ‘beliefs’, this«méconnaissance», is probably what allows them to know somuch, because this «méconnaissance», the actions that make it upare precisely what prevents the conflicts, tensions and rivalriesthat lurk behind tarantism from destroying families and communi-ties. When Ernesto De Martino conducted his field research in thesouth of Italy in 1959 he concluded that tarantism was a dying tra-dition. He judged that his observation in the field corresponded tothe scattered remains of what had been a much richer cultural for-mation whose traces he found in ancient writings and other cul-tural artefacts from the past. He partially blamed the CatholicChurch and partially the modern State for the demise of tarantism.He was probably right on both counts. However the fact that heconducted his inquiry within the ruins of a cultural edifice whichfor the most part had already disappeared raises an importantquestion to which it is difficult to bring any clear answer: the factthat the extensive knowledge which participants had of the innerworkings of the phenomena corresponded to the normal fun-ctioning of the tradition was it a sign of its advanced state of disso-lution or the cause of its disappearance?
5. A land without remorseJohn Rawls in his Theory of justice introduces a new type of devicein moral and political philosophy: the veil of ignorance. This is atwo step procedure. First we are asked to imagine individuals whoare called upon to choose the best theory of justice to regulatetheir common existence. It is therefore not us who are choosingthe best theory of justice, but them. That is the first step. Then weare asked to imagine that they are placed behind a «veil of igno-rance» that filters the type of information which they can access.Behind that veil of ignorance agents cannot know anything of whatconcerns them personally. They do know who they are. They donot know if they are rich or poor, to which social class they belong,what their profession is, whether they are risk adverse or not, andso on. The veil of ignorance makes them, so to speak, anonymousin their own eyes. However it allows the passage of all generalinformation concerning society and people. Thus, they can knowour best theories about society, economics or psychology, as wellas the results of natural science that are relevant to the under-
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standing of social life. The goal of the device is to prevent themfrom being biased in their own favour, when they are asked tochoose a theory of justice. They have access to all knowledge thatcan be relevant to their decision, and are ‘protected’ from theirrelevant information that could prevent them from reaching theright conclusion.In view of the nature of the above argument, we can concludethat hopefully we will learn something about justice, by seeinghow ‘they’ will choose in this ideal situation, where ‘they’ are notdistracted by the advantage that each one ‘naturally’ gives tohimself or herself. The goal of the veil of ignorance is to render ourvision clearer, as it protects us from the passions and biases thatblind us. Of course, we who are reading John Rawls’s Theory of ju-
stice have the knowledge of who we are and of our situation in so-ciety. We also have interests of which we are well aware, and knowwhich social arrangement would serve them best, but we areasked to ignore all this. Understood in this way the veil ofignorance constitutes a willful form of ignorance, a conscious «mé-connaissance» from which it is hoped that moral knowledge willemerge.Given its structure, once the veil of ignorance is lifted, andagents discover who they are, their weakness and advantages, theyshould have no regrets concerning the decision they previouslyreached. No matter what it is, this decision was reached in idealconditions. No one can object to it, its rationality and fairness areunimpeachable. In that sense, a just society is a land without re-morse. More precisely it is a land where remorse may have a cau-se, but where it cannot have a reason. It is a land where remorse isillegitimate. Given the place of the veil of ignorance in theconceptual economy of Rawls’s theory if, now that you know whatwas previously hidden from you, you regret the decision that youtook under the veil of ignorance, your desire to change what hap-pened cannot be justified.«Méconnaissance», the unfounded beliefs that associatespiders, dance, music and colors, according to De Martino, is whatmakes remorse possible, in the sense that it allows agents to cometo term with a past they regret. Here, to the contrary, «méconnais-sance» makes remorse impossible, in the sense that it deprivesagents of all means of dealing with a past they regret. Of course itmay be answered that in this case the past does not exist, theoriginal position is a logical fiction that by definition takes place in
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the eternal present. True enough, but it can also be argued thatwhat this «méconnaissance» willfully hides, by excluding all know-ledge of the relations that we have with each other, are the sourcesof frustration and tensions that lead to regret and remorse. Edu-cated persons who reject tarantism as a meaningless superstitionknow nothing of the specifics of the conflicts and tension that existin the society that cultivates the musical cure. More precisely theybelieve that these conflicts and tensions have their origin in pover-ty and in the cultural and technological backwardness that is res-ponsible for it. Of this general backwardness, tarantism constitutes,in their eyes, an evident symptom.There are many forms of «méconnaissance» and none ofthem, I believe, is an endangered species. However, the «mécon-naissance» that completely misreads the role of «méconnaissance»,threatens the stability of our societies much more than the knowl-edge of its violent origin does.
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